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Miscomputation

Nir Fresco & Giuseppe Primiero
Abstract. The phenomenon of digital computation is explained (often differently) in
computer science, computer engineering and more broadly in cognitive science. Although
the semantics and implications of malfunctions have received attention in the philosophy
of biology and philosophy of technology, errors in computational systems remain of
interest only to computer science. Miscomputation has not gotten the philosophical
attention it deserves. Our paper fills this gap by offering a taxonomy of miscomputations.
This taxonomy is underpinned by a conceptual analysis of the design and implementation
of conventional computational systems at various levels of abstraction. It shows that
philosophy of artefacts only represents one
type of miscomputation.

1 Introduction
Despite the possibly definitive characterisation of computability offered by the ChurchTuring Thesis, the understanding of what is computable has undergone important
changes. The debate nowadays oscillates between mathematical computability and its
concrete counterpart. Does the definition of an algorithm (viewed as a stepwise solution
for some computational problem) square with, say, the Turing Machine (hereafter, TM)
or any other extensionally equivalent computational model? This revolves around the
epistemic relation among four aspects of computability and physical computation.
1. The purely abstract notion of a computable function and the problem domain;
2. The algorithm for solving the computational problem;
3. The transition from an algorithm to a program (in some systems);
4. The physical execution of the program on some computational system.
In what follows, we take computation to be the execution of algorithm(s)1 and also
rely on an extensional characterisation of computation. We maintain that finite state
automata, pushdown automata, TMs, conventional digital computers and calculators

all

compute. As well, primitive Boolean gates (e.g., AND/OR/NOT gates) and some
combinational circuits, such as half adders and full adders, compute but only trivially. If
1

This characterisation is not unproblematic. For one thing, the precise notion of algorithm remains
unclear and is still debated in theoretical computer science and philosophy of computer science. The first
author discusses this problem elsewhere and proposes an alternative account of computation as
instructional information processing (REMOVED-FOR-ANONYMITY1 unpublished).

1

we adopt a broad (and vague) definition of algorithm, such as a well defined sequence of
steps that always finishes and produces an answer (Hopcroft et al., 2001, p. 373), then it
is easy to argue that the aforementioned systems compute by executing algorithms. In the
present discussion, we shall only be concerned with miscomputations in systems of this
type.
Whilst computation has certainly received attention in the literature, surprisingly,
miscomputation still lacks a sound characterisation, despite its pervasiveness. One
exception in the philosophical literature is the mechanistic account of computation, in the
context of which Gualtiero Piccinini emphasises the importance of miscomputation for
any adequate account of physical computation (2007, p. 505). A more recent exception in
the literature is the instructional information processing account, which gives reasons for
the occurrence of computational errors in both trivial and nontrivial computational
systems

(REMOVED-FOR-ANONYMITY1

unpublished).

Insofar

as

physical

computational systems are susceptible to errors and verification methods have been
developed in computer science to either prevent or isolate such errors, they certainly need
to be addressed by any adequate account of computation.
Still, the characterisation of miscomputation offered by Piccinini is too narrow. He
characterises miscomputation as a kind of malfunction, that is, as an event in which the
computational system fails to fulfil its function. Piccinini lists many cases of
miscomputation, including a failure of a hardware component, a faulty interaction
between hardware and software, a mistake in computer design and a programming error
(2007, pp. 523 524). But, as we argue below, malfunction (what we call operational
malfunction in the context of our analysis) is only one source of miscomputation. A
mistake in computer design, for example should not be classified as an operational
malfunction, yet, it still counts as a miscomputation. The objective of this paper is to
offer a multi-layered analysis of miscomputation.
computational systems.
We may call [... these two types of mistake] errors of functioning and errors of
conclusion . Errors of functioning are due to some mechanical or electrical fault
which causes the machine to behave otherwise than it was designed to do. In
2

philosophical discussions one likes to ignore the possibility of such errors; one is
therefore discussing

abstract machines . These abstract machines are

mathematical fictions rather than physical objects. By definition they are
incapable of errors of functioning. In this sense we can truly say that machines
can never make mistakes . Errors of conclusion can only arise when some
meaning is attached to the output signals from the machine.

When a false

proposition is typed we say that the machine has committed an error of
conclusion. There is clearly no reason at all for saying that a machine cannot
(Turing, 1950, p. 449).
functioning and errors of conclusion are examined in our analysis at a
finer level of granularity. We argue that a computational system can only make an error
of functioning (i.e., an operational malfunction), yet, to observe that, the analysis of errors
has to proceed at different levels of abstraction (hereafter, LoAs). The different notions of
computational errors, such as bugs , malfunctions , failures or mistakes , are typically
based on some common sense characterisation and they lack any precision. It is,
therefore, important to distinguish the different notions and associated meanings in
computer science and computational practice.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the relation between
miscomputation and malfunction of artefacts. In Section 3, we give some paradigmatic
examples of miscomputation in designed systems and sketch an initial characterisation of
miscomputation. In Section 4, we discuss three LoAs pertaining to the design of digital
computational systems: the functional specification of the system,
specification and the algorithm design. In Section 5, a distinction is made between
algorithm implementation in software and in hardware. Section 6 describes the lowest
LoA 2 where some miscomputation is bound to occur: the execution of algorithms in
physical systems. In Section 7, we offer a taxonomy of the miscomputations discussed in
the paper throughout the various LoAs. Section 8 concludes the paper.

2

proceed at even lower level, such as at the quantum-physical level.

3

2 Malfunction of Artefacts
Computational systems are different from other technological artefacts due to the tension
that exists in the former case between abstract and concrete. Because of the formal and
technological dimensions of computational systems, the task of analysing such systems is
a multi-layered enterprise. Whilst some attention has been given to the ontology of
computational objects (Turner, 2013) in philosophy of computer science (Turner & Eden,
2011), the methodology of their explanation has not yet been sufficiently investigated.
The contribution of our paper hinges on two important philosophical debates. On the one
hand, there is a long tradition of philosophical analysis of explanation of scientific
practice (cf. Hempel, 1965; Kitcher, 1989; Strevens, 2008; Woodward, 2005). On the
other hand, there has been an ongoing debate about malfunction in biological systems
versus in human-made artefacts (cf. Franssen, 2006; Millikan, 1989; Neander, 1995).
Whilst the first debate is interesting from a methodological perspective, the second
focuses on the ontology of functional systems. Our taxonomy also acts as a bridge
between these two debates. Abstract computational systems are susceptible to
errors and physical computational systems are subject to physical noise and are, thus,
prone to a different type of errors (namely, operational malfunction). From the
methodological perspective, the taxonomy honours the practice of computer science,
which is structured according to different LoAs.
The distinction between errors of functioning and errors of design (

errors of

conclusion) is also present in the philosophy of artefacts. However, the difference in
nature between errors of functioning and errors of design is clearer in the context of
computational systems, and it is easier to observe why operational malfunction only
applies to a narrow category of errors. Analogously to computational systems that can fail
to compute correctly, artefacts, in general, can fail to perform their functions for two
reasons. One is indeed malfunction proper (as discussed later in the paper), but the other
is a functional failure due to design mistakes. The ICE-theory3 offers one of the most well
developed accounts of technical functions including an analysis of artefact malfunctions.
On the one hand, technical malfunctioning is said to come in degrees
3
for Intentional, Causal-role, Evolutionist function theory. For more details on this
theory see Houkes and Vermaas (2010).
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(Houkes & Vermaas, 2010, p. 103). Accordingly, a
basic distinction is drawn between failing to operate as per design and failing to be
usable. On the other hand, another important distinction is drawn between token- and
type- malfunctioning. The latter requires again an appeal to design (e.g., describing all
light bulbs of a type as malfunctioning, since they all consume more energy than they
should; (ibid)).
The evaluation of an artefact malfunction, as in the case of a miscomputation, requires
an appeal to the design of the artefact. The ICE-theory, for example, requires an account
of what it means for the artefact to have the capacity to function, which is distinguished
from the ability to exercise such function (Houkes & Vermaas, 2010, pp. 106 108). The
former property is typically defined by appeal to design, whilst the latter is defined purely
in terms of errors of functioning

. In Jespersen &

Carrara (2011, p. 120) it is

an artefact is an F if, and

only if, it was designed (hence intended) to function as an F, irrespective of its capacity to
The design view, which squares roughly with etiological theories of
function, embeds a subsective understanding of the semantics of malfunctioning. On this
view, [a] malfunctioning F retains its proper function as an F, but forfeits its capacity to
function as an F
, of course, deep roots in philosophy of biology as well, for naturally
evolving organisms are also error-prone. Any adequate theory of the evolutionary source
of a (teleological) function has to account for the possibility of malfunction (Perlman,
2010, p. 54). Whether any insights from philosophy of technology about function and
malfunction can be extrapolated to philosophy of biology remains an open question, on
which we remain neutral here. The debate about the nature of biological function between
the Selectionist, who relates it to the history and evolutionary selection of the system
concerned, and the Systematicst, who relates it to the actual causal role it plays for the
system, remains unsettled (Perlman, 2010, p. 53). The ensuing discussion focuses on the
analysis of errors in computational systems.

5

3 Miscomputation in Designed Systems
We begin our analysis of miscomputation proper by considering an example. Suppose
that under normal circumstances a computational system S performs the computational
step C1 at time T1 on input I1 producing output O1, which feeds in as input to the next
computational step C2 at T2 producing output O2 at T3. Let us further assume that an
operational malfunction (at the hardware level) occurs, and yet S produces output O2 at
T3. S performs C1 at T1 as before, but it then malfunctions and performs C3 (instead of
C2) at T2 on O1 while still producing the same output O2 at T3. This is analogous to a two-

outcome is the same as the intended one (when it functions properly), we would still say
that S miscomputed (REMOVED-FOR-ANONYMITY1 2012).
This example shows how computation requires some notion of purpose in order to
distinguish a proper computation from a miscomputation. A computational system can be
said to act for a purpose according to its design. When a system fails to accomplish the
purpose for which it was designed a miscomputation can be identified. In the next
section, the notion of purpose is considered explicitly as a defining element of
specifications of computational systems.
But first, let us turn to some more examples of miscomputations. Consider the famous
Y2K bug, which was the result of the common practice (before the year 2000) of
abbreviating a four-digit representation of a year to two digits. A main reason for
representing years as two digits was to conserve memory space. It was not clear whether
the increment of year=99 to year=00 would be recognised by computational systems as
1900 or 2000. This problem was not limited just to software-based systems.
Another example is the famous 1994 Pentium FDIV bug. This microprocessor bug
point divide unit. This bug was only triggered upon certain input data and the degree of
inaccuracy of the result delivered depended upon the input data and the specific
instruction involved (Intel, 2004). Importantly, the cause of the bug was an error in a
script that downloaded some quotient digit values into a hardware lookup table. That
error resulted in a few lookup entries being omitted from that table.
6

Let us now consider the following two cases. The first one is an algorithm for
multiplying two positive natural numbers.
1 Read the values of X and Y.
2 Product = -1. // -1 represents illegal input
3 If both X and Y are positive integers:
Product = X*Y.
4 Return Product.
Code excerpt 1. An algorithm that multiplies two positive natural numbers.

Let us further assume that this algorithm is implemented in the Java programming
language as follows.
public static int computeProduct(int factor1, int factor2) {
int product = -1; // the value -1 represents illegal input
if(factor1 > 0 && factor2 > 0){
product = factor1* factor2;
}
return product;
}
Code excerpt 2. An implementation of the multiplication algorithm above in Java.

Whilst the algorithm for multiplying the two factors has no restriction of the result stored
in Product, the program implementation of product in Java has an upper bound of 231-1.4
If the program is executed and the calculated product exceeds this value, it will not
produce the expected output.
In which sense do the above examples qualify as miscomputations? We consider
Piccinini's definition of a miscomputation

mechanism m miscomputes just in case m

is computing a function f on input i, f(i) = o1, m outputs o2, and o2

o1 (2007, p. 505).

We note that this definition cannot be correct for all concrete computations. For a
computational system may produce the correct output fortuitously as a result of some
hardware malfunction. The first example discussed above shows that a computational

4

See http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/lang/Integer.html#MAX_VALUE for details.
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system S produces the output O2 despite a hardware malfunction. S produces the same
output that would have been produced had it not malfunctioned. However, O2 is produced
by following an incorrect computational step (compared with the specification of S that
we discuss in the following section). If we take f(I1) = O2, then S miscomputes and still
gives the correct output O2. This, we believe, shows why it is important to consider errors
at the appropriate LoA, but also to consider other LoAs for determining whether a
particular scenario is a miscomputation or not. The taxonomy that is offered below fulfils
this task.

4 Purpose, Specification and Algorithm Design
As Ray Turner points out the complexity of many contemporary computational systems
irrespective of their ontological nature, demands that they be treated as physical systems
(2011, p. 148, italics added). It is not a logical impossibility to verify the correctness of a
(complex) computational system but a practical one: the more complex the system is, the
less feasible it is to determine its correctness (or ensure the lack of any miscomputation in
principle). Whatever the method of verification is (in abstract or physical systems), in
order to determine whether a certain operation of the system is incorrect, some
correctness criterion (or criteria) is required. Determining whether an artificial system
miscomputes is certainly easier than determining it for a natural computational system
. At least in the former case,
we can refer to its purpose and specification.
Whether or not some system performs the correct computation can be established
objectively by examining its functional structure or design (below, we make a finer
distinction between the two). It is well known that the problem of whether there exists a
design, which satisfies a given set of functional requirements, is, in general, undecidable.
This problem is akin to that of finding a proof for a given sentence in first order logic. On
the other hand, the problem of verifying the correctness of a particular design (ex post
facto) against a given requirements specification is decidable. The undecidability of the
first problem exceeds the scope of this paper. To a first approximation, we stipulate that a
system miscomputes when it does not comply with the principles made explicit by its
specification(s).
8

Specifications of computational systems have a normative function that is central for
determining the correct or wrong behaviour of these systems.

t is the act of taking a

definition to have normative force over the construction of an artefact that turns a mere
definition into a specification (Turner, 2011, p. 140, italics added).

hether

a [computational system] malfunctions is not a property of the [system] itself but is
determined by its specification (Turner, 2011, p. 141, italics added). But, as we argue
below, it is only errors of conclusion that violate the normative value of specifications.
Errors of functioning (i.e., operational malfunctions), on the other hand, do not violate the
norms set by the specification. They are the result of noise. This reinforces the
importance of

inction between these two types of computational errors.

The characterisation of miscomputation relies on another relevant distinction that
should be made in the context of purpose, namely between internal and external
teleology. Objects that have some immanent property that makes them goal-directed can
be said to be internally teleological. If an object has some goal assigned to it by some
goal-conceiving agent (e.g., its designer), then it is externally teleological (Mahner &
Bunge, 1997, p. 368). Accordingly, a human-made artefact has an externally assigned
purpose, or in other words, a purpose-by-design. Yet, it seems excessive to say that a TM
only has a purpose as long as there is a purpose-attributing agent. Consider the following
claim. [A] computer on a dumping-ground has no purpose [...] whatsoever, although
[there may exist] somebody who retrieves it from there and

is able to rethink the

intentions of its designer, e.g., by examining its structure (Mahner & Bunge, 1997, p.
369). Once its purpose has been built in into its structure the goal of the TM remains
unchanged even in the absence of any purpose-attributing agent. A specific-purpose TM
is always directed to attaining a specific goal, namely, the computation of some function
(for example, f(n)=n+1). For a similar reason, a specific-purpose computer, which was
designed to compute the successor function, but somehow produces the output (n-1) for
the input (n

+

), is said to miscompute rather than just serve some other purpose.

For the present discussion, we stipulate that the purpose of a computational system is
determined by its design as it is reflected in its internal structure. Since the focus of this
opt the notion
of purpose by design, and, hence, characterise a computational system as externally
9

teleological. When the analysis of computational systems is extended to apply to the
t concern us at
present.
We now turn to the requirements specification of a computational system that is the
highest LoA 5 where the computational problem and problem domain are defined. We
refer to this level as the Functional Specification Level (or FSL). In the IT industry, a
software specification (referred to as software requirements specification, or SRS)
provides a complete description of the expected behaviour of the computational system to
be developed. An SRS specifies what the system is supposed to do functionally.
However, it may also specify some nonhardware, some possible interactions with other systems, design constraints that are
imposed on the implementation of the system (e.g., policies for database integrity,
resource limits, etc.) or performance constraints (e.g., the speed, response time and
availability of various software functions) (IEEE Computer Society, 1998).
Whilst

the

satisfaction

of

functional

requirements

by

the

corresponding

implementation is a crucial feature of both hardware and software verification, the
process of specification has typically been done by producing a natural language
description of a set of functional requirements. This introduces ambiguity that can lead to
unverifiability, due to the lack of a standard machine-executable representation. The use
of specification languages is common in computer science for properly describing the
purpose and conduct of a system at a very general LoA. These languages are typically
non-executable sets of description patterns for the properties and actions the system is
supposed to have and be able to perform. Data and functions are generally translated into
properties (e.g., using abstract state machines, or algebraically in Common Algebraic
Specification Language, or in a model-theoretic notation using the Vienna Development
Method or set-theoretically in Z, which is roughly based on the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms
for set theory).6
Although a specification does not (typically) specify the algorithm design of the
system in question, it does limit the possible number of algorithm designs. In some cases
5

6

A similar caveat applies here as in footnote 2.
For an overview of the logics of many of these languages, see, for example, Bjørner and Henson (2008).

10

the functional requirements of a specification may also include processing requirements
(indicating the computational steps of the system). But in the most general sense, these
specifications define the

input and output requirements. Thus, even if the

processing requirements are not defined explicitly, the possible set of algorithms is
constrained by the extension of the <permitted input, expected output> pairs defined7. A
specification defines the problem(s) to be solved, the set of permitted inputs and expected
outputs (pre- and post-conditions of the system), as well as supporting assumptions
regarding the system to be designed for solving the problem(s) in question. The purpose
of the system is to solve this problem under the given assumptions.
The more fine-grained specification (often referred to as a system design description,
or SDD, in the IT industry) describes (at a high level) what informational states the
system accesses and possibly by which instructional states it does so. We refer to this
level as the Design Specification Level (or DSL). A design specification reflects a
conceptualisation of the system under design that embodies its essential characteristics
(IEEE Computer Society,
2009). The objective of a design view, which guides the SDD, is to address design
constraints pertainin
correct, the complete set of design constraints needs to be addressed, and for it to be valid
there should be no conflicts among the design elements. This type of specification is
more than a stipulative definition of the system

it is a functional definition of the

system to a varying degree of accuracy. The more general the specification is (e.g., listing
only a few broad requirements), the less constrained the algorithm is.
At the FSL, only the intention(s) of the producer(s) of the (requirements) specification
can be considered. For convenience, we refer to this producer as the Architect, and to the
system designer as the System Designer hereinafter. This means that the inevitable gap
between the FSL and DSL leaves much room for error creep already at the DSL. In this
sense, the general criterion of correctness seems to be functionality-centric: make the
system do what you want it to do (Smith, 1996, p. 416). At the FSL, the conceived
7

Formally, the requirement for the correctness of the permitted input is expressed by a pairwise disjoint
union partition of the input domain in 1. Standard Domain, 2. Admitted Exceptional Domain, 3. Failure
Domain, and 4. Unexpected Domain. The correctness of the expected output domain is ensured by
expressing 3 and 4 as empty domains as a pre-condition of the system.
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functionality is simply specified by way of incomplete conditions that the system should
satisfy to produce a specific operation.
When considering an algorithm design, the functional design specifications can only
provide an informal measure of correctness by way of comparing the former with the
latter. We refer to the level of algorithm design as ADL (short for, algorithm design level)
and to the agent(s) responsible for the algorithm design as the Algorithm Designer (who
may, but need not, be the same as the System Designer). To establish a formal criterion
of correctness at the ADL, it is crucial to determine the model of implementation under
consideration. On the one hand, one can use a subset of possible physical simulation
patterns for verifying the given design (say, as specified by an SDD). A different
approach, which is less used in computer practice, is known in theoretical computer
science as formal methods. The specifications used in formal methods are well-formed
statements in mathematical logic and the formal verifications are deductions in that logic
(cf. (Meyer, 1985) and (Black et al., 1996) for a basic introduction).
By way of example, consider the execution of a program p under a given set of
for a certain specification S of p (that is, the program
type).8 This can be formally expressed as the validity of the logical expression N p:S.
Program termination formally corresponds to the correctness of the typing relation, in the
form of type-checking (i.e., given a program p, a specification S and a network N, is
N p:S a derivable expression?) and type-inhabitation (i.e., given a program p, is there a
specification S in a network N such that N p:S a derivable expression?). The benefit of
formal methods is that, in principle, they provide a means to establish correctness for all
possible inputs.
Our analysis shows that purpose is a conceptual, rather than an operational, criterion of
correctness. The abstract characterisation of the system is made more concrete when a
8

Here we implicitly refer to the proof-theoretical result known as Curry-Howard isomorphism
establishing a direct relation between computer programs and derivations. A valid contextual proof (or
lambda-term) is isomorphic to a program correctly executable in a network. This result, also known as
proofs-as-program identity, is based on the interpretation of formulae and specifications as types, of
which respectively proofs and programs are instantiating elements. This formal identity allows treating a
running program as formal objects, whose properties -- including correctness and termination -- can be
established by way of deductive methods. The isomorphism originates in observations by Curry (1934),
Curry et al. (1958) and Howard (1980). For a systematic treatment of the issue, see Sørensen & Urzyczyn
(2006).
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particular algorithm is designed according to the assumptions and various constraints
lower LoAs (i.e., algorithm design and algorithm implementation) is crucial, because it
directly provides a criterion of correctness in terms of the right procedure(s) to be
executed to produce the expected output (which as we have seen is missing at the FSL).
At the ADL, one has to refer to either practical correctness of the system by using
simulation patterns or a purely formal understanding of logical correctness (i.e., by using
formal methods). The result is that any list of all possible miscomputation scenarios
would be inherently incomplete. For verification methods in the former case consist in
generalisations from sample cases used in simulations and in the latter case consist in
abstraction from concrete aspects of the physical implementation of the system. It seems
inevitable then that the analysis of miscomputation must be extended to the level of
algorithm implementation (in either hardware or software).

5 Implementation of Algorithms as Programs or in Hardware
In the section above we have considered purpose, functional specification, design
specification and algorithm design - all leaving room for (different types of) error creep.
We turn next to consider the level of algorithm implementation (in either software or
hardware), to which we refer as AIL. The responsible agent is referred to as the Engineer.
Some systems compute by virtue of executing programs: a stored-program computer is
an epitome of such a system. Other physical systems do not execute programs (in the
classical sense used in computer science) but compute nonetheless, such as Boolean
gates. Boolean gates qualify, by our lights, as trivial computational systems, yet they do
not require the simple algorithm that they execute to first be converted into a program in
some programming language. The algorithm of a conventional AND-gate performs a
logical conjunction operation on two input data. This algorithm is executed directly by
the physical gate that implements it. More complex combinational circuits, such as halfand full-adders, execute algorithms that are implemented in hardware by using a network
of primitive Boolean gates. In the taxonomy of miscomputation that follows, we note that
the implementation of algorithms as programs adds another layer of potential errors that
is not present as such in the implementation of algorithms in hardware.
13

5.1. Software implementation of algorithms
The most common type of miscomputation in algorithm implementation in software is
compilation errors. A compiler translates the source program (i.e., the algorithm written
in a specific programming language) into a low-level machine language of the CPU (or
into assembly language in some cases) that can then be executed by the computational
system. When a compilation error occurs, the compiler fails to compile at least one part
of the source program. The result is a failure of the compilation process to produce the
target machine code.
The first type of compile-time errors is syntactic. It is the result of a violation of the
syntax or grammatical rules of a programming language. Some compiled languages, such
as C, Java and Pascal, for example, require that programs explicitly state the data type of
any variable at either the time it is declared or first used. In some interpreted languages
data type checking is performed at run-time (as opposed to at compile-time), thereby a
variable can refer to a value of any type, thereby making data type declarations
unnecessary. Other compile-time errors occur when some part of the source program
does not conform to the syntactic rules of the programming language. A simple, but
common, example is a missing semicolon at the end of some statement when the
programming language specifies that each statement must be terminated by a semicolon.
Another example is calling an undeclared variable or function. This error is typically the
result of misspelling the variable or function name.
The second type of compile-time errors is semantic. This type of errors is sometimes
identified with logic errors (cf. Dale & Weems, 2005, p. 237, 2008, p. 251), but not
always (cf. Dooley, 2011, pp. 297 298; Feldman & Koffman, 1999, p. 109; Purdum,
2012, p. 33; Shelly et al., 2006, pp. 76 77). Unlike syntax errors, semantic errors may or
may not be detected by the compiler depending on the particular programming language
and the compiler used. Semantic errors occur when the program complies with the
grammatical rules of the programming language, but the context of some statement or
expression is wrong. These errors violate the rules of meaning of the programming
language. If the compiler does not identify them, the program will produce the wrong
behaviour at runtime. Common examples of semantic errors are the following.
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Using a variable though it has not been initialised (e.g., for(int i; i<10; i++)
doSomething();). A Java compiler, for instance, should detect such an error
(Campione et al., 2001, p. 395).
Passing the wrong number (or type) of parameters to a function;
Adding a semicolon after the condition in an if or while statement in C/C++ or
Java (Dooley, 2011, p. 182);
Unlike syntax errors, some semantic errors may often be the result of a faulty algorithm
design, and not just the result of wrongfully translating the algorithm into some
programming language. A paradigmatic example is a division by zero (Dale & Weems,
2005, p. 237). Yet, this is where the distinction between semantic and logic errors is
blurry.
The next type of miscomputation at the present LoA is logic errors. In the literature
they are characterised as

errors that occur] when a program does not behave as intended

due to poor design or incorrect implementation of the design (Shelly et al., 2006, p. 77).
This characterisation shows that this type of errors is hard to discern from semantic
errors. The distinction is indeed subtle. Whilst semantic errors reflect a bending of the
syntax rules of the language [...,] logic errors [...] are the result of design errors the
programmer makes when manipulating

data (Purdum, 2012, p. 297). It is not clear

that this is always the case. A program code, such as
if (x<0 && x>0){
doSomething();
} else {
doSomethingElse();
}
Code excerpt 3. A Java program code with an if-else conditional statement.

does not manipulate data, yet it qualifies as a logic error, for regardless of the value of x,
executed.
We turn next to a brief discussion of errors in algorithm implementation in hardware.
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5.2. Hardware implementation of algorithms
As said above, some algorithms are implemented directly in hardware. Errors identified
at the present LoA may be collectively referred to as hardware design faults. Unlike
software that is not subject to physical noise (e.g., radiation, friction, power spikes,
temperature influence), hardware components are extremely vulnerable to it. As indicated
law, the number of transistors on integrated circuits increases as time
progresses, thereby leading to the growing design complexity of hardware circuits. When
this complexity is augmented with random noise signals, the possible types of
miscomputation in hardware grow rapidly. There are many different factors that may
induce hardware errors at runtime, which must be taken into account at the design phase.
A complete analysis of all the possible types of hardware design errors exceeds the scope
of this paper. We only make some observations that characterise hardware design, but do
not typically apply in the case of algorithm implementation in software.
The increasing demand for greater performance, complex functionality and
exponential reduction in size of c
resulted in the functional test generation being widely acknowledged as the bottleneck of
the hardware design phase. The main focus of this testing approach is to generate test
vectors that can verify the complex functionality of and interaction between multiple
design units. This is commonly done by generating millions of random test vector sets.
But this random test generation cannot guarantee the coverage of all possible
functionalities, particularly, in complex designs (Hari et al., 2008, p. 408). The traditional
worst-case design methodology becomes infeasible partly due to energy overhead and the
required a priori knowledge of all possible error sources at design time. As a result,
hardware design has to cater for the correction or mitigation of possible errors (May et
al., 2008, p. 456). It is, therefore, hard to classify all noise-induced errors as faulty
requirement specification of the hardware system. But certainly some assumptions should
be made at the level of system requirements, such as the expected temperature, range of
operation and voltage ranges.
Reliability and fault tolerance are crucial in hardware design. A common technique for
tolerating hardware faults is hardware redundancy by replicating all hardware
components that need to be introduced into the system to overcome possible operational
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malfunctions. These replicated components are superfluous if no faults occur, and their
removal does not diminis
(Williams et al., 2003, p. 126). Another technique is the introduction of software
redundancy that would otherwise not be needed in fault-free computation. Even
computers that recover from faults mostly by hardware means use programs to control
fault recovery. The software recovery design depends on the type of possible operational
malfunction that is expected (Williams et al., 2003, p. 127).9
By way of closing this section, we note that, unlike the verification of algorithm
implementation in software, the ever increasing complexity of hardware circuits makes it
impractical, if not impossible, to verify every circuit on a breadboard. Hardware
description languages (e.g., Verilog, VHDL and SystemC) make possible the verification
of digital circuits functionality before fabricating them on a chip. These languages play a
role in providing both a descriptive and a normative reading of the system in question,
offering assertions of properties and cycle behaviours to be satisfied by way of sequential
or conditional expressions, enriched by temporal operators. Properties in this context are
concise, declarative and unambiguous specifications of the desired system behaviour that
are used to guide the verification process (IEEE Computer Society, 2005). These
languages allow the elimination of most design bugs and use a very abstract level of
description of algorithm implementation in hardware without choosing a specific
fabrication technology (Palnitkar, 2003). Still, it is practically impossible to anticipate all
possible error conditions at runtime.10

6 Execution of Algorithms
In this section we discuss the algorithm execution level (hereafter, AEL). By the
execution of algorithms we mean the actual computational process in real-world systems.

9

Error handling has a proper counterpart in the logical design of programs that might fail to provide their
specified service (particularly in distributed architectures). This is typically done by providing rigorous
definitions of crucial concepts in design: the specification, the semantics of the program involved, its
semantics, an appropriate handling procedure is defined. For a comprehensive analysis of exception
handling design, see (Lee & Anderson, 1990) and (Buhr et al., 2002).
For more on simulation-based and formal verification techniques of hardware design the reader is
referred to Lam (2005).

17

Typically, any error that was introduced and not corrected at the higher LoAs is bound to
manifest itself at runtime under the appropriate conditions. Program runtime errors are
only detected when the program is executed on some physical computational system.
These are errors in either logic or arithmetic operations, but they could also occur as the
result of hardware failure. Typical examples are attempts to divide a number by 0,
running out of memory (unlike a TM with an infinite tape), invalid input (unexpected
input data for which there is no defined operation in the program) and software race
conditions where separate computer processes depend on some shared unsynchronised
state.
These errors (if unhandled) cause the execution of a program to terminate abnormally,
because the operation attempted is impossible to carry out. Since runtime errors can be
caused either by the program, an input to the program or a hardware failure, they can be
anticipated but hard to avoid. Where such errors can be anticipated, corrective steps
should be taken by the Engineer to avoid either an unexpected behaviour or an abnormal
termination of the program. But these errors cannot be completely avoided. Consider a
program that expects to read a file that was stored on the filesystem, only that the file is
either corrupted (e.g., due to some hardware failure) or nonexistent (e.g., another process
may have deleted it).
A hardware failure is simply a physical failure of some component in the computer
(that may be introduced by a faulty design). It can be a computational component, such as
an AND-gate, but it can just as well be a non-computational component, such as a
cooling system. Hardware components typically contain error detection mechanisms that
can detect when an error condition exists. Hardware errors can be classified as either
permanent or transient as a function of their duration (Williams et al., 2003, p. 126).
Permanent errors are caused by solid failures of components. They are easier to detect but
typically require the use of more drastic correction techniques than their counterparts.
Transient errors are intermittent failures that prevent the normal operation of a unit for
only a short period of time, which is typically not long enough to allow detection and
testing as in the case of permanent errors. Hardware errors can also be classified as either
correctable or uncorrectable errors (MSDN, 2012). A correctable error is an error
condition that can be corrected by the hardware or software by the time that the operating
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system is notified about its presence. An uncorrectable error is an error condition that
cannot be similarly corrected.

7 A Taxonomy of Miscomputations
The analysis presented above encompasses

functioning and errors of

conclusion. Errors of conclusion can be viewed as the parent category for various errors
either software or hardware), inclusive. They are typically associated with agents, such as
the Architect, the System Designer, the Algorithm Designer or the Engineer who is/are
responsible for [attaching] some meaning [...] to the output signals from the machine
(Turing, 1950, p. 449). On the other hand, errors of functioning are confined to
operational malfunctions at AEL. The taxonomy provided below maps each LoA with
one of four different kinds of error: mistakes, failures, slips (see REMOVED-FORANONYMITY2) and operational malfunctions. The taxonomy is summarised in table 1.
In our analysis we consider three categories of miscomputations.
1 Miscomputations due to the breaching of validity conditions 11 are classified as
conceptual.
2 Miscomputations due to the breaching of correctness conditions12 are classified as
material.
3 Miscomputations due to the breaching of physical conditions are classified as
performable.

11

Validity conditions here refer to both validity and satisfiability criteria on the specification. The logical
validity of a specification is typically given by formulating the behavioural description of a program in
(propositional) conjunctive normal form. One can check whether for each disjunctive atom in the same
conjunct the negation is also available, and if so, then logical validity is proven. Otherwise, logical
validity cannot be proven. Satisfiability is the weaker logical counterpart that only requires one positive
evaluation for an atom. The class of propositional formulas in conjunctive normal form has a
straightforward check for syntactic validity, but a hard one for satisfiability.
12 Correctness conditions here refer to the relation of logical, total and partial correctness between the
program and its specification. Logical correctness refers strictly to the relation that the syntax of the
expression (program) bears to the construction rules allowed by the alphabet and language in question. An
incorrectly formulated program will not yield an output that conforms to its specification. More generally,
an algorithm is said to be totally correct, if it outputs the value required by its specification and halts. It is
said to be partially correct, if no claim is made about its termination.
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The first and second categories of miscomputation apply to FSL down to AIL. At
the FSL, a specification that contains two contradicting requirements fails to satisfy
validity conditions. For example, a global requirement might be that the computational
system continues operating even when database connectivity is lost (say, by using the
filesystem instead for temporary storage). But another contradicting requirement
pertaining to some critical subsystem would be such that it implies a strong coupling with
the database (thereby, failing to operate in the absence of database connectivity). At the
ADL, AIL (and sometimes DSL), a validity condition concerns how the routine selected
and the task required match. For example, at the ADL and AIL, unbounded recursion or
unbounded while loops in real-time systems13 are the wrong fit because of the mission
criticality and response-time sensitivity of these systems.
Correctness conditions refer to the DSL, ADL and AIL. They refer to the structure of
the selected routine in consideration of the output to be generated. At the DSL, consider,
for example, an interaction among three components of the system, S1, S2 and S3. S1
(correctly) invokes some subroutine resulting in S2 being called to process this request.
Yet, if S3, which is the target consumer of the output generated by S2, does not receive
this output, the overall interaction is said to not satisfy correctness conditions.
At the ADL, we may consider a simple TM, T, that fails to satisfy some correctness
conditions. Given any tuple as input, T
(i.e., T computes f(x1...xn)=1). Its configuration would be defined by the following set of
six quadruples of the form (current-state, symbol-scanned, operation, next-state).
1 STATE1-READ1-WRITE0-STATE1
2 STATE1-READ0-MOVERIGHT-STATE2
3 STATE2-READ1-WRITE0-STATE1
4 STATE2-READ0-MOVERIGHT-STATE3
5 STATE3-READ1-WRITE0-STATE2
6 STATE3-READ0-WRITE1-STATE4
STATE4 is the Halting State. Suppose that a second TM,

, whose configuration is given

by a similar set of quadruples only that the fifth one does not move the TM back to
STATE2, but rather moves it directly forward to STATE4. In other words, once T
13

These are systems that are used to control and monitor physical processes and are rigidly constrained in
terms of their response time and/or the validity of their data.
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STATE3

T

would still be valid, but incorrect for computing f(x1...xn)=1. After having deleted the first
input argument, T

econd input

input and write 1. T
second input argument.
Similarly, at the AIL, the program has to be well formed, but correctness conditions
are not limited only to the grammatical rules of the particular programming language.
Consider the following example in Haskell pseudo-code:
let list l := [2,3]
let list m := [4,5]
l ++ m := [2,3,4,5]
in 1 : [l++m] = [1,2,3,4,5]
Code excerpt 6

The ++ operator appends one list to another and the : operator adds elements to the head
of a list. Hence, while the statement
in l : [[4,5]] = [2,3,4,5]
is a legal regular expression, the statement
in [2,3] : [4,5] = ?
is illegal. For the latter attempts to add a list to integer elements that are not a list, thereby
resulting in a non-homogeneous object (see, e.g., Davie, 1992, pp. 24 25). This in turn
induces a compile time error, due to a type mismatch between [Int] and a list. We note
that the Y2K bug discussed above falls in this category too. For, at the AIL, the wrong
representation of the year data was used.
We call mistakes those conceptual errors that may occur at the FSL, DSL, ADL and
AIL. They correspond to designin
of the

If the purpose of the system were only to operate

under some circumstances, but not others, then it would be wrong to classify that system
as miscomputing under different circumstances when it does not produce the expected
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result. Mistakes could occur due to a miscomprehension of the requirement(s)
formulation by the System Designer, a semantic error due to a bad translation of
algorithm design into some programming language or a logic error due to a poor
algorithm design. They could also occur at the hardware implementation level, where
they are introduced at the level of hardware system design or by a wrong matching
between software and hardware.
We call failures those material errors occurring at the DSL, ADL and AIL. They can
occur at the DSL when a conceptually correct system requirements specification is
wrongly formulated as a system design specification. Consider a software system
intended to track and manage goods requests, goods production, their delivery and
payments. Assume that the System Designer receives a valid and correct system
requirements specification. Let us further assume that the system design specification
produced is valid insofar as no contradictory actions are specified. However, the design
specification is not correct if, for example, no routines are included for the tracking and
management of payments. Failures can occur, at the ADL, when, say, a correct and valid
SDD is translated into a faulty algorithm (e.g., the TM

discussed above for computing

the function f(x1...xn)=1). An example of a failure at the AIL is the 1994 Pentium FDIV
bug discussed above. The error in the script, which downloaded some quotient digit
values into a hardware lookup table, occurred whilst implementing the algorithm directly
on the chip.
The third category of performable miscomputations applies to the AEL only. We call a
computational system error under physical conditions an operational malfunction.
Malfunctioning at the AEL corresponds simply to the well-known cases of errors at
runtime by either hardware failures or a combination of software and hardware failures.
This family of miscomputations can occur despite satisfying validity and correctness
conditions. Malfunctions may be introduced at higher LoAs, but manifest themselves at
runtime. Consider the case of a CPU meltdown at runtime. This meltdown may be the
result of some non-computational component failing to perform its designated operation
(e.g. a breakdown of the cooling system due to wear and tear or a faulty design). It can
physical processes or forces, such as
radiation, heat or friction. It can also be induced by faulty hardware and/or software
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design, such as a poor choice of physical material for electronic components that
dissipate excessive heat in normal operation or faulty software design incorrectly leading
to a constant voltage feed in some chip.
The last type of errors is a slip. Slips are not produced by a wrong categorisation, a
wrong system design, or a faulty translation of algorithm design at AIL. They apply to
either syntax or semantic errors that are induced at the level of algorithm implementation
in software. Notice that any of these errors would be characterised as a slip, only if it
occurs notwithstanding the intention of the Engineer to avoid blunders in translating a
valid and correct algorithm design into the corresponding code (i.e., moving from ADL to
AIL). The Engineer fails to perform those tasks correctly, although s/he knows the
syntactic and semantic rules of the particular programming language for implementing
the algorithm design.
Is our taxonomy general enough to include abstract computational systems? TMs, for
example, are seen as perfect abstractions of conventional digital computers. It is possible
to argue that TMs, by definition, do not miscompute. But this claim is true, only if by
miscomputation we mean operational malfunction (or errors of functioning). TMs are
analysable at the ADL and as such they are susceptible to any errors that may be induced
at that LoA or the ones above (i.e., FSL and DSL). A specific TM, M, whose input tape is
inscribed with a string s, which is not well formed, might seem similar to the invalid
input runtime error mentioned above. If M receives s as input and halts, but not in
accepting state, does it indeed miscompute for s? Hardly. M computes correctly. It is
simply undefined for computing on input s and so M halts but does not accept s.
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Agent

LoA

Architect

FSL

Conceptual

Material

Performable

Error Type

Contradicting

Mistake

requirements
System

DSL

Designer
System

Invalid design (mismatch

Mistake

with the FSL)
DSL

Incomplete design

Designer

(relative

to

Failure

the

FSL)
Algorithm

ADL

Designer

Invalid

routine

(a

Mistake

violation of either wellformedness

or

consistency rules)
Algorithm

ADL

Incorrect routine

Failure

Engineer

AIL

Syntax error

Engineer

AIL

Semantic error

Engineer

AIL

Logic error

Mistake
Mistake

Designer

Engineer

Slip
Slip

AIL

A wrong selection of

(Hard-

hardware (e.g., using an

ware)

AND-gate for a logical
disjunction operation)

Engineer

AIL

Wrong

Failure

(Hard-

implementation

ware)

(e.g.,

the

Pentium

1994
FDIV

bug)
N/A

AEL

Hardware

and/or

software error

Operational
malfunction

Table 1. This table summarises the various LoAs discussed and the different possible errors.
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8 Conclusion
This paper provides a systematic taxonomy of miscomputations in conventional
computational systems. We have tracked errors that may be introduced at various levels
starting from the functional description of the system that defines its purpose through
algorithm design and implementation down to the lower level of physical computation. In
this taxonomy we identify four types of miscomputation: mistakes, slips, failures and
operational malfunctions. Arguably, the first three types of miscomputation are
introduced at the levels above the physical computation. The last one only occurs at the
physical level (AEL).
The philosophical debate on malfunctioning thus far has been deprived of a systematic
way to account for different ways of explaining what it actually means for a system to
behave incorrectly. We believe that the present taxonomy is a backdrop for further
research, at least in the case of conventional computational systems. How much this
taxonomy extends to other human-made artefacts or biological systems remains to be
established.
We note that it is only

operational malfunction

that may be

relevant in the case of computational theories of mind. For this type of miscomputation
need not presuppose the notion of external purpose. Another curious result is that by
reserving the notion of miscomputation to apply only to operational malfunctions, the
cause of the miscomputation is often the physical substrate that is contingent to the
computational process itself.
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